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Abstract—Password leaks have been frequently reported in
recent years, with big companies like Sony, Amazon, LinkedIn,
and Walmart falling victim to breaches involving the release
of customer information. Even though passwords are usually
stored in a salted hash, attackers still guess passwords because
of insecure password choices and password reuse. However,
the adverse effects of a password breach can be mitigated by
changing users’ passwords. We introduce a simple yet powerful
algorithm to reset user account passwords automatically, while
still allowing users to authenticate without any additional effort
on their part. We implemented our algorithm as a Firefox add-on
that automatically resets a user’s password when they log in to
their account, and stores the new password in the built-in Firefox
password manager.
I. INTRODUCTION
Breaches that leak millions of passwords, e.g.
LinkedIn [28], [13], [15], Yahoo [21], [12], Walmart [17],
and iCloud [22] are becoming a daily news event. But while
password leaks can lead to both financial loss and loss
of privacy [9], [10], organizations can be slow to detect
breaches [31].
Many methods proposed to protect users from the effects
of password leaks, such as OAuth [29], SAuth [16], and Two
Factor Authentication [24], require server-side implementa-
tion. Despite these solutions, users still have to create strong,
unique, memorable passwords and reset their passwords often.
But the amount of effort required to create and maintain such
passwords leads users to create similar, sometimes the same,
weak passwords for multiple accounts, and make only minor
changes when required to change their passwords [8].
We propose an effort-free, client-side solution to the prob-
lem of password theft in the form of a Firefox add-on to
automate password resets, which we call Fluid Passwords.
The idea behind our add-on is: for a given website, after a
user logs in, seek out the site’s password reset page, generate
a secure random password, and update the password for the
account. By leveraging Firefox’s built-in password manager,
we can then store the updated password for use at the next
login, all without requiring any interaction from the user. By
leveraging Firefox Sync, users can access both their stored
passwords and the add-on on any computer they login with,
effectively reducing the number of passwords any one person
has to remember to the one they use for Firefox Sync. But
the Fluid Passwords add-on is not itself a password manager
- instead, its primary task is to automatically find a password
reset page and reset a password so the user doesn’t have to.
We demonstrated the add-on’s success on 23 out of 29
websites from Alexa’s top 100 websites [1], and provide
suggestions for making it work on the remaining 6 sites in
section V-D. Fluid Passwords addresses 3 main problems:
1) Creating a strong and memorable password is difficult.
2) Creating a unique password for every site is difficult.
3) Changing passwords is difficult, and especially changing
passwords often enough to foil attackers who gain access
to an old password is difficult.
Although solutions to the problems exist, client-side solu-
tions to changing passwords are still imperfect and require user
interaction citegottLastpass, dashlanePasswordChanger. In the
case of users on a single computer, i.e. users who don’t need
Firefox Sync, our add-on solves all of these problems. In the
case of users on multiple computers, our add-on reduces the
problems to the problem of maintaining a single password, i.e.
the one to access Firefox Sync. We claim this add-on helps
mitigate the effect of password leaks by continuously changing
a user’s passwords.
Our main contributions are:
• Creating an algorithm to refresh user passwords that
doesn’t require user interaction.
• Creating an algorithm to find a website’s password-reset
page.
We also wrote scripts to automatically submit password-
reset forms and login forms. We implemented these in a
Firefox add-on, evaluated its performance, and gave it a
comparative rating as an authentication scheme.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. In sec-
tion II, we review previous literature. In section III we detail
our algorithm’s design and implementation. In section IV, we
detail the algorithm’s successes and failures. In section V we
examine the usability and security of the implementation. In
section V-D we discuss potential improvements. We conclude
in section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Protection After a Leak
Past research has focused on helping users create strong
passwords, e.g. with PwdHash [23], an add-on that turns a
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simple password into a long and random one, allowing users
to create memorable passwords and have good security. In the
case of a breach where password hashes are stolen, strong
enough passwords resist even attacks by experts [27]. How-
ever, password-strengthening solutions like PwdHash cannot,
by design, protect a user once their password is stolen or
guessed. In that scenario, a user must reset his or her password
to prevent an attacker from using it, and must change it enough
that the attacker cannot guess the new one.
Previous work to protect user accounts in the face of a
password breach has focused mainly on server-side solutions.
O-Auth [29] is a partial solution that provides authenticated
parties with only the privileges those users should be allowed.
However, there are studies that show that OAuth is intrinsically
vulnerable to App Impersonation attack [11].
SAuth [16] employs authentication synergy among different
web services. A user wishing to access service S must also
authenticate their account on service V, where S and V are
any two web services that are used daily. For example, if a
user wants to login into Facebook the protocol redirects user
to also authenticate their account on Google. However, users
might use the same password for both services S and V, and if
not, then it places an additional burden on users as they have
to remember two passwords to access a single service, and
it does not prevent attackers from accessing all the services
available to a legitimate user.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) [24] is an increasingly-
popular protocol in which users authenticate with two different
forms of authentication. For example, users might have to enter
a temporary password/confirmation code provided via SMS
or email, or authenticate with a smart card [30]. OPass [25]
is one such protocol that adds an additional one time key,
sent to the user’s cell phone at the time of authentication.
Another 2FA protocol uses ambient noise to authenticate
without user interaction [14]. As the authentication requires
a separate authentication token in addition to a password,
users are safe even in case of a password leak. But because
of the inconvenience of waiting for the one-time password,
confirmation code, or ambient noise tests, these methods are
not commonly used.
B. Protection from Password Leaks
In addition to securely storing passwords with salted hashes,
various algorithms and techniques have been developed to de-
tect password leaks and cracking [5], [19]. But these solutions
are often complex and costly to deploy and maintain.
Hardware scrambling is another way to avoid password
leaks [6]. Trusted hardware such as Scramble S-Crib [7] is
used to scramble passwords before they are hashed on the
server. The server hardware holds the encryption keys that
scramble the password, so this hardware is required to do any
password guessing. Hence even in case of hash leaks, attackers
cannot crack the passwords.
Many websites and organizations follow the practice of
password expiration on an interval, e.g. 1 to 3 months, after
which the users have to change their existing passwords.
Fig. 1. A high-level description of the algorithm.
However, this approach is unscalable for users [26]. As
a workaround for this problem, users use similar or the
same passwords for multiple accounts and across password
changes [8].
In contrast to the above solutions, our add-on works on the
client-side, so any user can employ it for themselves, it works
on multiple sites, and it is effort-free for the user. It is free,
and requires no special hardware or reliance on third-party
software. The only restriction is that users use the Firefox
web browser.
III. DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
A. General Overview
The flow diagram for Fluid Passwords is illustrated in
figure 1. The steps are as follows:
1) Identify when the user accesses a login page. When the
user submits the login form, go to the next step.
2) Capture the login credentials. After a successful login,
go to the next step.
3) Search for a link to the site’s password reset page.
Hyper link pattern Priority level
privacy 0
setting 1
profile 2
account 3
security 4
preference 5
my login 6
edit profile 7
password 8
change password 100
TABLE I
PRIORITY AND PATTERNS
a) First, check for the site in a file that maps a site’s
base address to its password-reset page (which we
called purls.txt). If the site is found, go to the next
step.
b) Otherwise, search the current page for the URL
most likely to lead to the password reset page.
4) Push the current tab onto a stack and open the selected
URL in a new tab.
a) If the new page is a password reset page, generate
a new random password and submit the password
reset request. Then store the new password in
Firefox’s password manager. If this site wasn’t
in purls.txt, store its site/password-reset-page URL
pair now.
b) If the new page is a login page, enter the captured
credentials, submit the login form, and return to
the previous step.
c) Otherwise return to the previous step.
5) Close any extra tabs opened by the program.
We chose a successful user-login as the start time for our
add-on for two reasons. First, it provided a simple way to
obtain the user’s credentials in case they weren’t already stored
in Firefox’s password manager. Second, it means the add-on
runs whenever the user logs in, which we expect to be far more
often than the 60-day password expiration guideline published
by NIST [20].
However, it is important to note that if the add-on cannot
find the password reset page, then no password is changed;
so the add-on fails safely. In addition, all the websites we
observed had only one password reset page, so the add-on
will not accidentally change the password saved in Firefox’s
password manager without actually resetting the password on
the site.
The critical steps are as follows:
1) Identifying the Login Page
• Login pages can almost always be identified by
searching for a form with a pattern of text field,
password field and a submit button.
2) Capture Login credentials
• After identifying the fields above, we simply get the
text in those fields.
3) Identifying Successful Login
• Most of websites redirect to the login page on a
failed login attempt; therefore a successful login can
be identified by failing to find a login form after
entering the credentials.
• We can also identify failed attempts by searching
for strings that indicate an error, like “invalid pass-
word”, or “incorrect username”.
4) Selecting a URL
• Each URL is assigned a priority value. Priority
values are chosen based on the text string that
an < a >< /a > tag encapsulates, with higher
priority values given to the strings that are more
likely to lead to a password reset page. Then the
URL with the highest priority value is chosen. For
example, a hyperlink with the text “password” has
higher priority value than a hyperlink with the text
“account”, so the algorithm would select the URL
in the tag with the first string.1
The current implementation has 10 priority levels,
as shown in table I. We were unable to find any
literature on the subject, so values were chosen
based on our own observations of the websites listed
in table II. These were the most common links
used to navigate for password reset. For example,
on Facebook we navigate from Settings → General
→ Edit Password. The further away a link is from
the password reset page, the lower priority value it
received.
• The URL with highest priority value on the current
page is selected. Then the current tab is pushed
onto a stack, and the selected URL is opened in
a new tab. We repeat this process until we land on
password reset page.
• If the new tab does not produce any URL, we move
back to the previous tab (popping the current tab
from the stack) and select the URL with next highest
priority.
5) Opening the URL in a New Tab
• The add-on opens the new tab in the background.
While users can see the tabs that the add-on opens
and closes, the tab the user logged in with remains
the active tab (assuming the website doesn’t change
it), so the work in the background tabs does not
affect the user’s experience.
6) Identifying a Password Reset Page
• As we were unable to find any literature on iden-
tifying password reset pages, we designed our al-
gorithm based on our own observations. Password
reset pages have various designs, but most of them
have a form with a text field (for usernames),
three password fields, then a submit button. We can
1At this time the algorithm has hardcoded English phrases it searches for,
though in the future it would be appropriate to include search terms in an
easily-updated file, especially one with multiple languages to account for non-
English websites.
identify a password reset page by searching for a
form with this design.
B. Password Generation
The contribution of Fluid Passwords is the automated pass-
word reset after successful logins and finding the password
reset page for each website. Any password generation al-
gorithm can be used to generate a secure password to be
stored in the browser’s password manager. We created a simple
password generator for the add-on to make it compatible with
the websites we tested on, and examine the security of that
generator in this section.
The password generator produces pseudorandom 12-
character strings from the 95 printable ASCII characters minus
the space character, because we found the space character did
not work on many websites. In other words, the set of 94 char-
acters [0-9A-Za-z`˜!@#$%ˆ&∗() +− =[]\ {}—;’:”,./<>?].
It uses Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library [18] as a secure
pseudorandom number generator to generate passwords. We
chose to create 12-character passwords so the add-on would
work with sites that require a maximum password length of
12 characters. Sites with stricter requirements are discussed in
section V-D.
Since passwords are chosen probabilistically, we can mea-
sure the security of the passwords with Shannon entropy.
Low entropy would imply the password distribution is fairly
predictable. For example, the entropy of the English alphabet
is between 0.6 to 1.3 bits per character. Formula 1 shows that
we need a minimum 6.55 bits per character to encode the
passwords in binary form. Since we cannot use only part of
a bit, we require a minimum 7 bits per character, meaning a
12-character password requires 84 bits to encode.
H(X) = −
∑
i
P(xi)logbP(xi)
= −
∑
i=1,...,94
1
94
log2
(
1
94
)
= 6.5546...
(1)
RFC 4086 recommends 56 bits for higher-than-moderate-
security passwords in 20152 [3]. Our algorithm far exceeds
that, but it falls short of the recommended 88 bits for a very-
high security password3. We could improve the security by
adding non-ASCII characters or lengthening the password.
However, using non-ASCII characters would make retyping
passwords difficult for those users who wished to do so,
and lengthening the passwords would cause some websites
to reject them for being too long. Therefore, we chose to use
the current algorithm at this time.
2They recommend 49 bits, plus 2/3 of a bit per year due to Moore’s law,
giving us 56 in 2015.
375 bits (for a password in 1995) +20 ∗ 2/3
C. Implementation
Since web browsers are the most common interfaces for ac-
cessing online accounts, we chose to implement our algorithm
as a Firefox add-on.
For testing, we used a computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4510U processor, 8GB RAM. It had a 64-bit Windows 8.1
Operating System, and we developed our add-on with cfx for
FireFox version 42.0, using Mozilla Firefox Addon-SDK 1.17
and JQuery 1.11.3.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Websites
We tested our add-on with sites chosen from Alexa’s top
100 websites in December 2015 [1]. A detailed list of all the
websites is given in appendix A. Table II lists the websites we
chose to test our add-on with, and whether or not the add-on
supported these websites. In total, we tested our add-on on 29
of the top 100 sites.
Table II lists the websites we considered. In the case of
websites where the add-on didn’t work, we give the limitation.
Limitations included: being unable to fetch a reset link from
a button, and being unable to trigger keyboard event listeners
for form inputs when we updated the text in an input box. We
address these limitations in section V-D. We note that when
the add-on doesn’t work, it has no adverse effects on a user’s
experience, and the websites that the user visits still work.
On these sites, the user would have to change their password
manually, as if they didn’t have the add-on.
We list the 72 websites that we did not choose to test on,
along with the reasons, in appendix A. Although Google was
the most popular site on the list, we chose not to consider it
because changing a Google account password causes Android
tablet- and smartphone-users to login again with their new
password. We ignored websites in a foreign language, since the
add-on can only match hyperlink strings against text patterns
in English. We ignored websites that ask for security questions
as part of a password reset after logging in, as it requires
more user-interaction to automate such actions. We ignored
torrent and adult websites on ethical grounds, and we ignored
websites with no logins, such as news sites, or websites which
served as landing pages for other sites, since they do not
require users to login.
Table III lists the percent CPU usage and memory usage (in
MB) by Firefox web browser during the process of password
reset, with and without the add-on enabled. The first two
columns are when the add-on was enabled, and the third and
fourth columns are when the add-on was not enabled. The
last two columns show the difference in overhead caused by
the add-on. Overall, the difference is negligible, with the add-
on adding only 1.48% more CPU usage and 16.54 MB more
memory usage on average. And it is worth noting that these
times were tested the first time we accessed a site. Because
the add-on stores the password reset URL and in future logins
can directly open the password reset page instead of searching
again, we expect it to use even less overhead during future
logins.
The add-on’s listeners take a few seconds to attach to the
web page elements, and they must wait until the web page
loads all its content. When the add-on’s listeners fail to attach,
or the user submits the form before the listeners are attached4,
the add-on does not continue executing: it neither opens any
tabs in the background nor resets the user’s password. This
4In practice, this happened when a user’s password manager auto-filled
their credentials and they clicked “login” as soon as it appeared
Fig. 2. Login on landing page
Fig. 3. Simple Login page
does not cause the browser to crash, but merely to behave as
if the add-on was not installed during this login.
B. Improvements & Accuracy
In this section, we discuss the various improvements we
made as we went through different versions, making the add-
on support websites with different designs. Depending upon
the basic flow from a login page to a password reset page,
websites can be broadly classified into three categories.
1) Simple Websites: These websites have a simple design
where the landing page/home page has a basic login form with
a user name, a password and a submit button. The design of the
password reset page is also simple with an optional username,
three password fields, and a submit button. Figures 2 and 3
show the design for simple login pages. Facebook has a
login page on its landing page, whereas Yahoo redirects to
a new page with simple login design. Figure 4 shows a basic
password reset page from Linkedin. The control flow for this
website, identifying the login page to submitting the password
reset form, is straightforward. 30.7% of the websites in table II
fall under this category. Our initial implementation worked
only with these types of websites.
2) Websites that require re-login: These websites ask a user
to login again before they can change their password. 19.3%
of the websites in table II fall under this category, including
Amazon and eBay. To support these websites, we added an
additional check for a new login page and added code to wait
on the redirect to password reset page.
3) Complex Websites: We chose priority values for URLs
based on our observation that the URL would lead to password
reset page. Therefore, it’s not always certain that we will
Limitations (if any) Websites (count: 29)
n/a (add-on works, 23 sites) Facebook.com(2), Yahoo.com(5), Amazon.com(6), Wikipedia.org(7), Twitter.com(9), Linkedin.com(14),
Ebay.com(17), Vk.com(21), Instagram.com(26), Reddit.com(32), Pinterest.com(38), Paypal.com(40), Imgur.com(43),
Imbd.com(47), Stackoverflow.com(54), Craigslist.org(56), Ups.com(67), Flickr.com(70), Github.com(72),
Indeed.com(75), Fc2.com(82), Nytimes.com(90), Wikia.com(95), Dropbox.com(97)
Reset link in a button Tumblr.com(42), Dailymotion.com(93)
Unable to trigger event listeners Wordpress.com(39), Netflix.com(52)
TABLE II
A LIST OF WEBSITES CONSIDERED, TOGETHER WITH THEIR RANK
With Add-on Without Add-on Difference
Websites CPU% Memory(MB) CPU% Memory(MB) CPU% Memory(MB)
Facebook 11.11 117.95 10.37 108.56 0.74 9.9
Yahoo 10.72 156.3 10.19 140.32 0.53 15.98
Amazon 12.56 197.76 11.74 160.52 0.82 37.11
Wikipedia 9.51 130.41 9.20 125.65 0.31 4.76
Twitter 10.92 162.87 10.81 143.51 0.11 19.36
LinkedIn 8.61 125.62 8.23 122.18 0.38 3.44
eBay 17.80 219.86 13.76 201.65 4.04 18.21
Vk.com 11.58 180.18 11.42 160.35 0.16 19.83
Instagram 15.64 156.3 13.19 140.32 2.45 15.98
Reddit 13.52 150.3 10.72 133.32 2.8 16.98
Pinterest 15.21 114.3 9.46 111.20 5.75 3.1
Paypal 11.43 235.27 10.54 200.32 0.89 34.95
Tumblr 12.61 152.40 12.03 141.03 0.58 11.37
Imgur 13.71 112.53 10.90 86.52 2.81 26.01
Fc2 10.63 113.51 10.09 110.3 0.54 3.21
Stackoverflow 13.92 125.52 11.57 98.51 2.35 27.01
Craigslist 9.34 120.47 8.68 115.8 0.66 4.67
Ups 14.61 130.12 13.18 119.37 1.43 10.75
Flickr 10.51 162.3 9.43 153.4 1.08 8.9
Github 12.86 184.81 10.96 176.31 1.9 8.5
Indeed 11.89 96.53 10.34 92.04 1.55 4.49
Amazon.in 13.5 214.50 11.57 140.32 1.93 74.18
Nytimes 16.55 156.61 15.81 143.12 0.74 13.49
Wikia 12.75 96.3 11.63 91.32 1.12 4.98
TABLE III
CPU & MEMORY USAGE
Website Without Add-on With Add-on
eBay.com 6 sec (avg) 15 sec (avg)
TABLE IV
AVERAGE TIME TO SIGN-IN TO A WEBSITE.
Fig. 4. Simple Password reset page
find the password reset page. The initial algorithm design
would stop when both the current page was not a password
reset page, and the search process found no new links. But
e-commerce sites such as Amazon and eBay have a large
number of hyperlinks, and in fact 50% of the websites listed
in table II fall under this category. To handle these scenarios,
we implemented a depth-first search, in which failure causes
Fig. 5. eBay Re-Login page
the algorithm to go back to the previous tab and select the
URL with the next-highest priority. In theory, this design
would exhaustively search a site’s URLs and eventually find
the password reset page. However, we set a threshold of 20
opened pages, after which the algorithm terminates. Figure 6
shows how this might work in practice.
Fig. 6. Depth-First Search Design
1) Select URL-3 (the highest priority URL) and open it in a new tab.
2) The new tab with URL-3 has 3 URLs. URL-5 has the highest priority level, so open URL-5 in a new tab.
3) The new tab has no new URLs, so we go back to the previous page.
4) URL-7 has the next highest priority, so we open it in new tab.
5) URL-9 has the highest priority in this tab, and the process continues.
C. Limitations
The add-on does not support websites that send a confir-
mation code or reset link to user’s email/phone, or that ask
for security questions in order to reset a password. And many
banking websites require users to enter a CAPTCHA to login,
so our add-on does not support those websites when a re-login
is required.
In addition, the current implementation does not support any
Google-based website, because Google’s password reset page
leverages a div tag for form submission.
On the other hand, Wordpress and Netflix both listen for
actual keyboard events before allowing form submission, so
simply assigning a value to a text box with textBox.value does
not work in this case.
We provide suggestions for addressing these limitations in
section V-D.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Comparative Rating
We rate our add-on using Bonneau’s framework for com-
parative evaluation of authentication schemes [4]. Naturally,
our scheme inherits many of its qualities from passwords and
Firefox’s password manager, though in some cases it exceeds
both.
Usability
1) It is memorywise-effortless for users at a single com-
puter, and quasi-memorywise-effortless for users of Fire-
fox Sync, as the sync password is the only password
users need to remember.
2) It is scalable-for-users, as the add-on and password
manager handle all the passwords.
3) It is nothing-to-carry.
4) It is quasi-physically-effortless, for the same reasons
Firefox’s password manager is.
5) It is easy-to-learn, because passwords are.
6) It is efficient-to-use, more so than passwords because
this does not require typing.
7) The current version does not have infrequent-errors. The
ideal version (that works on every website) would have
infrequent-errors, as users need only click the login
button.
8) It does not have easy-recovery-from-loss, for the same
reasons Firefox’s password manager doesn’t.
Deployability
1) It is accessible, for the same reasons Firefox’s password
manager is.
2) It has negligible-cost-per-user.
3) The current version is quasi-server-compatible, as it
works on some websites but not others. The ideal version
would be server-compatible.
4) It is not browser-compatible, though in future work we
would extend the add-on to other browsers.
5) It is not mature, as it is newly-created.
6) It is non-proprietary.
Security
1) It is quasi-resilient-to-physical-observation, like Fire-
fox’s password manager.
2) Likewise it is quasi-resilient-to-targeted-impersonation.
3) It is resilient-to-throttled-guessing, as it generates se-
cure, random passwords.
4) It is resilient-to-unthrottled-guessing, as there are
9412 ≈ 278 possible passwords.
5) It is not resilient-to-internal-observation.
6) We claim it is quasi-resilient-to-leaks-from-other-
verifiers, both because it generates unique passwords
for each site and because it resets passwords relatively
quickly.
7) It is resilient-to-phishing.
8) It is resilient-to-theft under the same assumptions that
Firefox’s password manager is.
9) It does not offer no-trusted-third-party.
10) It requires-explicit-consent.
11) It is unlinkable, because it generates random passwords.
B. Firefox Sync
Firefox Sync is a service offered by Firefox wherein users
can create an account on Firefox that allows them to share
information across devices, especially passwords and add-
ons [2]. Users login to their account with a username and
password, so Firefox Sync acts as an online password manager
with a master password.
When users have Fluid Passwords without using Firefox
Sync, they are limited to storing their passwords on one device,
so that Fluid Passwords will not function on other devices
(because it won’t be able to access the user’s login creden-
tials). However, when users employ both Fluid Passwords
and Firefox Sync, and share passwords and add-ons across
devices, Fluid Passwords will function any time the user is
using Firefox, and their updated passwords will be stored and
accessible on any of their devices running Firefox.
C. Other considerations
The add-on is very simple to use, as it only requires the
user to run Firefox and install the add-on. However, the
current version of the add-on only works on websites for
which the user has stored his or her credentials in Fire-
fox’s password manager. For example, if a user stores their
Facebook credentials in the password manager, but not their
Linkedin credentials, then the add-on would only work with
their Facebook account, not Linkedin. Similarly, the add-on
doesn’t work for multiple users. For example, if two users,
A and B, both use the add-on, but A stores their Facebook
password in the password manager and B doesn’t, then the
add-on would only change A’s password. And Fluid Passwords
may cause problems for users who use the add-on on one
device, e.g. their computer, but also need to login to a site
with another device that doesn’t have access to the add-on, e.g.
an iPhone. With the current version of the add-on, the only
way for such a user to login with their second device would
be to look up their password in Firefox’s password manager,
or on Firefox Sync if they use it. However, because Fluid
Passwords relies on Firefox’s password manager, the cost of
losing a password is as low as using the password manager
alone. The user would need to reset their password and store
the new password in their password manager.
Once the add-on has successfully reset a password on a site,
it stores the URL of the password reset page in a separate file
named purls.txt. After that, whenever it encounters the same
website again, it uses the link in purls.txt to go directly to
password reset page. This has 3 main implications:
1) Users can share purls.txt files to increase our pool of url
mappings. In particular, users could submit their purls.txt
files to a central server, which could then update a master
list and distribute it to users, effectively crowdsourcing
password-reset-URL searching.
2) Sites that have personalized URLs for their password-
reset pages cannot be usefully stored in purls.txt, and
the add-on will be forced to search for the URL each
time the user logs in.
3) It allows the add-on to work on non-English sites. Any
site in the purls.txt file ignores the (currently) English-
only url-searching algorithm and jumps directly to the
password reset page, where it looks only at form element
types, which are all written in HTML language.
We must also discuss the insecurity of an add-on that
automatically fills in user credentials when it finds a login
form. Once the user triggers the add-on’s automatic password
reset functions by logging in, it may navigate to sites with
malicious scripts that request login credentials to steal them.
We don’t have a good solution for this problem, except to
rely on the sites themselves to keep the pages a user sees
after logging in free of such scripts.
D. Future Work
Capturing login credentials is difficult for websites where
the web page has dynamic forms, forms nested in iframes, and
other complexities5. Identifying a successful login becomes
difficult when we have hidden or dummy login-forms6, or
when it is difficult to identify a login page7.
Traversing URLs is the next crucial task to reach password
reset page. Our current version looks for text hyperlinks on the
page to assign priority, but this method fails when the URLs
are embedded as hyperlinks in images or buttons. In addition,
identifying a password reset page is difficult when forms on
the page do not follow the normal pattern8. Finding a single
algorithm for all sites on the web would be an important step
forward.
Two sites stand out in particular: Google and Dropbox.
Google’s password reset page has a div tag with a click-listener
for its form submission. Assuming the tag has the same id for
every user, we might attempt to find the tag and issue it a
JavaScript click. Dropbox listens for keyboard events to fill in
its password reset form, denying our script the ability to do
so, and the tags in its forms have enough unique information
to prevent our simply creating our own input tags with the
required information. We might try simulating keyboard events
with JavaScript to fill in such forms.
While our primary concern is getting our add-on to work
on every site on the web, we would ideally also extend our
5e.g. zillow.com, etsy.com, buzzfeed.com
6e.g. godaddy.com has a dummy login form on the user’s profile page
7e.g. aliexpress.com, alibaba.com, flipkart.com
8Optional username, three password fields, then a submit button. E.g.
wordpress.com, themeforest.net
add-on to Google Chrome, Safari, and other browsers, as well
as mobile phones. The add-on currently does not mesh well
with mobile phone usage, since mobile phones typically do
not have the same add-ons installed as desktop computers.
However, Firefox and Chrome at least allow mobile phone
users to sync their passwords across devices, so would have
up-to-date passwords on their mobile phones.
We would also like to add the ability for users to blacklist
sites that they do not want the add-on to function on. This
would allow users to handle passwords for those sites on their
own, while still gaining the benefit of the add-on on other
sites. And such a blacklist could be seeded with sites that
require passwords shorter than 12 characters, so that the add-
on doesn’t waste time attempting to create a new password
for that site every time a user logs in. We note, however, that
the add-on does not break on any site - it simply exits without
changing a user’s password and closes any open tabs, keeping
the process invisible to the user.
The code for generating passwords currently only produces
random 12-character passwords, but some sites have more
exact requirements, e.g. at least 1 uppercase, 1 lowercase, 1
number, and 1 symbol. Future work for the add-on would in-
clude detecting a site’s password requirements and modifying
the password generation algorithm to create passwords that fit
them.
Last, since the goal of Fluid Passwords is to provide better
usability and security, a user study would confirm our tool is
user-friendly and non-intrusive, but we expect that to be the
case due to the design of the algorithm. We stress that this
add-on works in the background, so it does not interfere with
a user’s browsing experience.
VI. CONCLUSION
We developed an algorithm to automatically reset user
passwords and implemented it in Fluid Passwords, a Firefox
add-on that leverages Firefox’s password manager to improve
the security and usability of passwords online. Fluid Pass-
words solves the problem of password reuse, and reduces the
problems low password strength, and the difficulty in making
frequent password changes to a single password, allowing
users to put more focus on maintaining a secure password
while expending less effort overall. In its current version, it
works on 23 out of 29 sites from Alexa’s top 100 sites, and
has inherent functionality to work on many more, and adds
negligible cost to performance with only a small cost to login-
time.
While there are many more improvements that can be made,
this is currently the only client-side solution we know of
to keep accounts secure after a password leak without user
interaction. We plan to release Fluid Passwords as an official
Firefox add-on.
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APPENDIX
1) Google.com
2) Instagram.com
3) Google.es
4) Indeeed
5) Facebook.com
6) Msn.com
7) Googleadservices.com
8) Cnn.com
9) Youtube.com
10) Microsoft.com
11) Netflix.com
12) Amazon.in
13) Baidu.com
14) Aliexpress.com
15) Amazon.de
16) Go.com
17) Yahoo.com
18) Amazon.co.jp
19) Stackoverflow.com
20) Google.co.id
21) Amazon.com
22) Google.co.uk
23) 360.cn
24) Xinhuanet.com
25) Wikipedia.org
26) Reddit.com
27) Craigslist.org
28) Blogger.com
29) Qq.com
30) Ask.com
31) Tianya.cn
32) Google.com.au
33) Twitter.com
34) Google.fr
35) Diply.com
36) nytimes
37) Google.co.in
38) Google.com.br
39) Ok.ru
40) Bbc.co.uk
41) Taobao.com
42) Tmall.com
43) Google.ca
44) People.com.cn
45) Live.com
46) Onclickads.net
47) Alibaba.com
48) Cntv.cn
49) Sina.com.cn
50) Pinterest.com
51) Google.com.mx
52) Pixnet.net
53) Linkedin.com
54) Wordpress.com
55) Pornhub.com
56) Gmw.cn
57) Yahoo.co.jp
58) Paypal.com
59) Google.com.hk
60) Ebay.de
61) Weibo.com
62) Mail.ru
63) Naver.com
64) Google.pl
65) Ebay.com
66) Tumblr.com
67) Amazon.co.uk
68) Googleusercontent.com
69) Google.co.jp
70) Imgur.com
71) Ups
72) Dailymotion.com
73) Yandex.ru
74) Sohu.com
75) Xhamster.com
76) Google.co.kr
77) Blogspot.com
78) Xvideos.com
79) Rakuten.co.jp
80) Wikia.com
81) Vk.com
82) Google.ru
83) flickr.com
84) Chinadaily.com.cn
85) Hao123.com
86) Imdb.com
87) Kat.cr
88) Dropbox.com
89) T.co
90) Apple.com
91) github.com
92) Livedoor.jp
93) Bing.com
94) Google.it
95) Soso.com
96) Ebay.co.uk
97) Google.de
98) Fc2.com
99) Nicovideo.jp
100) Dailymail.co.uk
WEBSITES NOT CONSIDERED FOR TESTING
Reason Websites (count: 71)
App breaks the live smartphone connection Google.com(1)
No Login(2) Ask.com(33), Cnn.com(76)
Torrent(1) Kat.cr(71)
Adult(3) Xvideos.com(45), Pornhub.com(63), Xhamster.com(68)
Landing page for other sites(2) Go.com(78), Onclickads.net(37)
Security Question(7) Live.com(12), Bing.com(24), Msn.com(27), Microsoft.com(28), Aliex-
press.com(29), Apple.com(48), Alibaba.com(61)
Duplicate(12) Youtube.com(3), Google.co.in(10), Blogspot.com(20), Google.co.uk(31),
Googleadservices.com(51), Google.ca(60), Blogger.com(81),
Google.com.au(83), Googleusercontent.com(92), Amazon.co.uk(66),
Amazon.in(77), Ebay.co.uk(99)
Foreign website(44) Baidu.com(4), Qq.com(8), Taobao.com(11), Sina.com.cn(13),
Yahoo.com.jp(15), Weibo.com(16), Google.co.jp(18), Yandex.ru(19),
Hao123.com(22), T.co(23), Google.de(25), Amazon.co.jp(30),
Google.fr(34), Google.com.br(35), Tmall.com(36), Mail.ru(41),
Sohu.com(44), Google.ru(46), Google.it(49), Google.es(50),
Amazon.de(53), 360.cn(55), Tianya.cn(57), Diply.com(58),
Ok.ru(59), Google.com.mx(62), Google.com.hk(64), Naver.com(65),
Rakuten.co.jp(69), Soso.com(73), Nicovideo.jp(74), Google.co.id(79),
Xinhuanet.com(80), Bbc.co.uk(84), Pople.com.cn(85), Cntv.cn(86),
Pixnet.net(87), Gmw.cn(88), Ebay.de(89), Google.pl(91), Google.co.kr(94),
Chinadaily.com.cn(96), Livdoor.jp(98), Dailymail.co.uk(100)
TABLE V
A LIST OF WEBSITES NOT CONSIDERED, TOGETHER WITH THEIR RANK
